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Emissions trading markets have been touted as the most efficient
mechanism to achieve environmental goals at least cost. Whether in
the form of voluntary markets or in a mandatory framework like in the
first phase of the European Union (EU) Emission Trading Scheme
(ETS), the regulator sets a cap on the emissions which can occur
without penalty, and provides emissions allowances accordingly. The
recipients are free to use these emission certificates to cover their
emissions, or to sell them to the firms which are expected to emit
more than what they can cover with their original allocations.
As observed in most existing programs, cap-and-trade systems can
fail to reach their emission targets as too generous an allocation of
pollution permits serves as a disincentive for emissions reductions
and deflates pollution prices. Moreover, the implementation of the
first phase of the EU-ETS has been widely criticized on one more
sensitive account: providing significant (some went as far as calling
them obscene) windfall profits for power producers.
Here we weight on this debate with the results of a rigorous quanti-
tative modeling undertaking, providing insight into what went wrong
in the first phase of the EU-ETS, and proposing alternative reduction
schemes with provable advantages. Using market equilibrium models
and numerical tools, we demonstrate that properly designed market-
based pollution reduction mechanisms can reach pre-assigned emis-
sions targets at low reduction cost and windfall profits, while being
flexible enough to promote clean technologies. In the present article,
we illustrate our claims with the results of a hypothetical cap-and-
trade scheme for the Japanese electricity market.
environmental finance | emission markets | cap-and-trade scheme
To protect the environment and reduce industrial pollu-tion, market-based mechanisms (cap-and-trade systems,
emission trading schemes) are considered as one of the most
promising tools. The most prominent examples of existing
cap and trade systems are the EU ETS, the US REgional
CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) program and now,
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). In such systems,
a central authority sets a limit (cap) on the total amount of
pollutant that can be emitted within a pre-determined period.
To ensure that this target is complied with, a certain num-
ber of credits are allocated to appropriate installations, and
a penalty is applied as a charge per unit of pollutant emitted
outside the limits. Firms may reduce their own pollution or
purchase emission credits from a third party, in order to avoid
accruing penalties. The transfer of allowances by trading is
considered to be the core principle leading to the minimiza-
tion of the costs caused by regulation: companies that can
easily reduce emissions will do so, while those for which it is
harder buy credits.
Ideally climate policies seek compliance with a given emis-
sion target at the lowest possible consumer and producer
costs, and aim for a change in the production portfolio to-
wards cleaner technologies. Though after the first phase of EU
ETS it has been questioned whether today’s emission trading
schemes can reach any of these goals at all. Using an hypo-
thetical emission trading scheme for the Japanese electricity
sector, our theoretical and quantitative analyses confirm the
shortcomings of the first phase of the EU ETS: with a poor
implementation, pollution reduction targets can be missed,
and consumers can get the brunt of the operation while pro-
ducers enjoy excessive profits, the so-called windfall profits
which can exceed actual abatement costs by several orders of
magnitude. More often than not, the main weapon suggested
to combat windfall profits is auctioning of allowances. In this
article we show that auctioning is not an appropriate measure
to eliminate windfall profits
The main thrust of the present contribution is to demon-
strate that most of the above problems can be solved by prop-
erly designing the cap-and-trade scheme. We propose a simple
relative allocation mechanism in which besides a free upfront
allocation, allowances are allocated proportionally to the in-
stantaneous (as opposed to historical) production of goods
(the proportionality factor being fixed at the start of the com-
pliance period). In particular we show that this allocation
scheme can reach the same emission target while reducing
average windfall profits to zero and keeping abatement costs
nearly at the same level as standard cap-and-trade schemes.
Our tests are performed on a one compliance period prototype
modeled after the first phase of EU ETS, hence not allowing
for banking or borrowing of allowances. However, it is clear
that the conclusions drawn from our comparative statics do
remain the same in the more realistic setting of multi period
models.
To illustrate the benefits of this mechanism we com-
pare it to tax-based abatement policies, generic cap-and-trade
schemes (such as those implemented in the first phase of the
EU ETS), and cap-and-trade schemes with a 100% auctioning
of allowances. In this article, we illustrate the theoretical out-
comes from [1] and provide policy makers and regulators with
analytic and quantitative tools to design and implement cap-
and-trade schemes capable of a) controlling the incentives to
promote changes in the production portfolio towards cleaner
technologies and b) reaching reasonable pollution targets at
low reduction costs and windfall profits.
Theoretical Analysis of Cap-and-Trade Schemes
For the sake of completeness, we recall some stylized facts
about the first phase of the EU ETS that we use in our anal-
ysis. At the inception of program the regulator
• controls the initial distribution of allowances;
• sets the level of the penalty for each emission unit not
offset by an allowance certificate at end of the compliance
period.
Then, risk neutral firms compete for the production of goods
(e.g. electricity), whose production causes emissions, while
their demand and their production costs (e.g. coal and gas
Abbreviations: GHG, greenhouse gas; EU, European Union; ETS, Emission Trading
Scheme; RECLAIM, REgional CLean Air Incentives Market; RGGI, Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative; BAU, Business As Usual
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costs) change randomly over time. During the compliance pe-
riod (typically 3-5 years), each firm dynamically adjusts its
production (and consequently its emissions) and its trading
in emission credits to maximize its own terminal wealth.
Equilibrium Models.The analysis of cap-and-trade schemes
can be conducted in the framework provided by the math-
ematical theory of equilibrium economic models. In [1], we
provide a rigorous mathematical analysis of an equilibrium
model for a finite set of risk neutral agents/firms facing a ran-
dom inelastic demand and random production costs. Here we
use the computer programs developed for [1] to illustrate the
pros and cons of different cap-and-trade schemes. We study
an Emission Trading Scheme covering the Japanese electricity
sector as the basis for our conclusions and recommendations.
For each market design, the program provides
• Monte Carlo scenarios for equilibrium production policies,
prices of goods and pollution permits;
• For each scenario, computations of pollution levels, reduc-
tion costs, producers windfall profits, and end-consumers
costs.
Our mathematical analysis shows that in equilibrium (when
prices are such that demand and supply match), prices of the
goods are given by production costs and allowance prices as
follows: for each specific good (say electricity), and at any
given time t, we introduce the notion of effective production
cost C˜jt when technology j is used in the presence of regula-
tion. This effective cost is defined by the formula
C˜jt = C
j
t + e
jAt [1]
where Cjt denotes the cost without regulation, At is the al-
lowance price at time t, and ej is the emission per unit of pro-
duced good when using technology j. The price for the good
at time t is then given by the classical merit-order relation: it
is equal to the effective production costs of the most expensive
technology needed to meet the demand. On this account, one
sees that the allowance price enters additively in the effective
production costs, though nonlinearly in the equilibrium prices
in the presence of a cap-and-trade scheme. This formula has
two clear consequences. On the one hand, the additive term
ejAt can change the merit order of technologies. Indeed, if al-
lowances are expensive, then a pollution-intensive technology
can appear costly and be scheduled last for production. This
effect creates cleaner overall production. On the other hand,
the costs ejAt offer to the producers the opportunity to sell
allowances on the market instead of using technology j, cre-
ating opportunity costs. For consumers, this means that the
allowance price enters the price of the good at any time t with
a factor ej representing the specific emission of the production
technology which is marginal at time t. In other words, the
cost of pollution ejAt can be viewed as the cost of an extra
fuel needed for the production of the goods. At this point,
we clearly see the difference between consumer’s burden and
true costs of pollution reduction. The reduction costs come
from switching to cleaner, hence more expensive production
technologies, and are driven by a change in the merit order.
This is, however, not the only extra cost passed along to the
consumer. In the presence of regulation, consumer’s costs in-
crease by ejAt for each unit produced at time t. This gives
rise to huge windfall profits which we define precisely in the
short appendix at the end of the paper.
Can a Standard Cap-and-Trade Scheme Meet Emissions Tar-
gets?.As observed in the SOx and NOx RECLAIM program
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Fig. 1. Effect of the level of the penalty on the statistical distribution of the ac-
tual emissions at the end of a period of implementation of a standard cap-and-trade
scheme.
and after the first phase of the EU ETS, cap-and-trade sys-
tems can fail to reach their emission targets as too generous
an allocation of pollution permits serve as a disincentive for
emissions reductions and deflate pollution prices. However
the same is also true for a regulation with too low a penalty
in case of non compliance. This effect is illustrated in Figure ,
which depicts the histograms of the total emissions computed
for each of the equilibrium Monte Carlo scenarios generated
for the purpose of our case study. For the sake of definiteness,
we consider the standard cap-and-trade scheme with different
penalties, and with an initial allocation of 300Mt which cor-
responds, in the case of Japan’s electricity market, to a 20%
reduction target. See details given below.
The case with zero penalty corresponds to Business As
Usual (BAU): obviously, it misses the reduction target by far.
When the penalty is set at 20$ per ton, the emission target
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Fig. 2. Histograms of the differences between the consumer costs, reduction costs,
windfall profits and penalty payments of an standard cap-and-trade scheme and the
corresponding quantities for BAU. Here, the cap-and-trade scheme is calibrated to
reach the emissions target with 95% probability.
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is missed by the same amount with a very large probability.
With a 40$ penalty, there is a significant probability to meet
the target, but the distribution of the emissions has a long
tail overshooting the target. On the other hand in the case of
a 100$ penalty, the probability to reach the reduction target
is 95%. This shows that the probability for a cap-and-trade
scheme to reach a given emission target depends not only sig-
nificantly on the initial allocation of allowances, but also on
the penalty applied in case of non compliance, though the im-
portance of the penalty is often underestimated. The main
thrust of this article is to demonstrate that cap-and-trade
schemes work as long as parameters are properly calibrated.
An example of a rigorous calibration of these parameters is
presented in [1].
Costs of a Standard Cap-and-Trade Scheme.While the spe-
cific distribution of the initial allocation of emission allowances
among the various participants (installations covered by the
scheme) does not influence the overall emissions reduction, it
plays other important roles which we now investigate. One
of the goals of climate policy is to promote a change of the
production portfolio towards cleaner technologies. We argue
in [1] that this goal is not reached automatically by introduc-
ing emission trading schemes. However such objectives can
be reached by benchmarking the initial allocation, e.g. by
distributing the initial allowances (as in part of EU ETS or
RGGI) depending upon the type of power plant, or even as a
reward for building clean plants. Note that, since allowances
have a financial value, this can be seen as a direct subsidy
financed by the other market participants.
However whether or not a cap-and-trade scheme can be
considered a success also depends upon the overall costs in-
curred to reach the emission target, as well as the part of these
costs that are passed on to the end consumer. To illustrate
the relative importance of the different costs associated with
a standard cap-and-trade scheme, Figure compares reduc-
tion costs, penalty payments, end consumer costs and wind-
fall profits in the case of our model of the Japan electricity
markets. For these computations, we use a 100$ penalty and
an initial allocation of 300Mt.
It turns out that consumers’ costs (in average 15.13$ per
MWh) exceed by far the overall reduction costs (in average
1.96$ per MWh), which as it was the case in the first phase of
EU ETS, gives rise to huge windfall profits for the producers.
Obviously, costs of production are higher in the presence of a
cap-and-trade scheme. This is because, due to the emission
constraints, producers switch to cleaner and more expensive
technologies to avoid paying the penalty. However for a 20%
reduction target, average abatement costs are only 1.96$ per
MWh of produced electricity! Though as observed in EU ETS
consumers costs exceed the overall reduction costs by far (a
factor of 8 in the present case). This is one of the main rea-
sons for the huge windfall profits which have been the core
of the main criticism of cap-and-trade schemes by consumer
advocates.
It is commonly believed that an initial auctioning of al-
lowances, even partial, will reduce windfall profits. However,
we show below that even auctioning of the total initial alloca-
tion of a standard cap-and-trade scheme may not reduce wind-
fall profits to a reasonable level. Moreover full auctioning of
the allowances does take away a major regulatory mechanism
to control the incentives. This leads us to consider propor-
tional allocation schemes, which can reduce windfall profits
to zero (at least in average) and preserve enough initial allo-
cation to still allow the regulator to set incentives with this
tool.
Alternative Cap-and-Trade Schemes
In light of the shortcomings of the first phase of EU ETS which
were documented in the public press and illustrated earlier,
it is important to understand if the implementation in ques-
tion is to blame, or if cap-and-trade schemes are doomed to
fail. Several alternative reduction mechanisms are proposed
and studied in [1]. They include a form of emissions tax, and
several random allocation schemes. Here we highlight one
proportional scheme (which we call relative scheme from now
on) as an alternative to the standard EU ETS - which we
call standard scheme for the sake of definiteness. We compare
our relative scheme to the standard scheme with and without
auctioning or emission tax.
A Proportional Allocation Scheme. In this new scheme, the
upfront allocation is only part of the overall emission target,
a big part being distributed over time, proportionally to the
production of goods (in electricity markets nothing should be
allocated to nuclear production). Since allowances have a fi-
nancial value, allocating allowances proportionally to the pro-
duction reduces the marginal costs of production and hence
the price of goods and windfall profits.
In the case of random demand, the lack of certainty may
worry some environmentalists concerned about the fuzziness
surrounding the emissions target. But because historical data
are readily available, econometric models can be brought to
bear, and the statistics of the future demand for goods can
be estimated with great accuracy. In this way, the regulator
can calibrate the proportionality coefficient of the distribu-
tion of pollution certificate in order to meet emissions targets
with any given statistical degree of certitude, using for ex-
ample percentile measures in the spirit of Value-at-Risk as in
the previous section when we discussed the standard scheme.
Notice that even in a standard cap-and-trade scheme with
deterministic emission target the probability for emissions to
exceed a given emission target is not negligible (see e.g. [1] and
[2]). The reason is the randomness of electricity demand. Our
quantitative analysis confirms that applying standard econo-
metric methods, emissions targets can be reached with any
given statistical measure of risk, both for the proportional
and for the standard cap-and-trade scheme.
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Fig. 3. Yearly emissions from electricity production for the Standard Scheme, the
Relative Scheme, a Tax Scheme and BAU.
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Auction.The most frequently advanced approach to reduce
windfall profits is to replace free allocation of allowances
(which was common practice in the first phase of EU ETS) by
an auction-like procurement. With auctioning, producers pay
for allowances and the regulator can return revenues to con-
sumers or invest these revenues in other emission reduction
projects. However, auctions are not sufficient to efficiently
reduce windfall profits. Indeed, by selling allowances, one is
able to collect an amount which is essentially equal to the total
number of allowances times the allowance price. This money
will, in general not match the overall consumer burden, since
the latter is related not to the number of allowances, but in-
stead to the number of product units consumed within one
compliance period. In the following case study, we assume
that prices are not changed by the auction and the price set-
tled in the auction corresponds to the equilibrium price settled
at the beginning of the trading period under free allocation.
Taxes.The last type of pollution reduction mechanism we con-
sider is a static tax that is paid for the emission of each ton of
CO2 – equivalent. In the case of the electricity markets where
demand can be considered to be inelastic, the tax has to make
coal more expensive than gas (which emits less CO2) to trig-
ger any emission reduction. However, since both coal and gas
prices are stochastic, the emission reductions are nearly im-
possible to control with a tax. This is illustrated in Figure
below.
Comparison of the Various Cap-and-Trade Schemes
We illustrate our claims by comparing the three alterna-
tive reduction schemes discussed above in a case study of
the Japanese electricity market with data extracted from
Japanese official projections for 2012.
Case Study: the Japanese Electricity Market.At the core of
our analysis is the main abatement mechanism in electricity
production: the fuel switch from coal to gas. This was the
main abatement mechanism in EU ETS [3]. As explained in
a recent governmental task force report [4], this is also the
abatement mechanism with the largest abatement potential
in the Japanese electricity sector.
The Japanese electricity market is divided into an Eastern
and a Western part, with only 1 Giga Watt interconnection
capacity. Hence, for the purpose of this case study, we assume
that we are dealing with two separate electricity markets shar-
ing a joint emission cap. We use the production capacities
given in Table 1.
Assuming further that the Japanese electricity market is
totally deregulated we can use a straight-forward generaliza-
tion of the results of [1] to this situation. The numerical results
reported below are based on the following assumptions:
The goal of the regulator is to reduce emissions by 20% of
what the emissions level would have been at the end of 2012
under the Business-As-Usual (BAU) scenario. This implies
an emission target of less than or equal to 300 Mega-ton of
carbon dioxide. Since we are working in a non-deterministic
framework, this target must be interpreted accordingly. We
consider reduction schemes with a compliance period covering
the year 2012 and with
(*) total emission less than or equal to the cap of 300
Mega-ton of CO2 with probability of 95%
Controls available to the regulator:
i) Standard scheme: size of the penalty, and total number of
allocated allowances.
ii) Relative scheme: size of the penalty, total number of al-
lowances allocated upfront, and factor of proportional al-
location.
iii) Tax scheme: tax levied to discourage dirty production
Calibration. In order for our comparison of the various
schemes to be meaningful and fair, we choose the parame-
ters in the following way. For the standard scheme, the initial
allocation is set to 300 Mega-ton of carbon dioxide. Setting
the penalty at 100 USD, numerical calculations confirm that
(*) is satisfied. To make schemes comparable, we need to ad-
just the other parameters of the different schemes. For the
relative scheme, we also set the penalty to 100 USD, the up-
front allocation to 63Mt CO2 (this is equivalent to 20% of the
cap in the standard scheme) and the proportionality factor to
0.45 to fulfill (*). For the tax scheme, (*) is met with coal
taxation at 39.5$/tCO2 . Details of the calibration procedure
needed to fine tune the right coefficient of proportionality are
given in [1].
Yearly Emissions. Figure gives the plots of the statistical dis-
tributions of the yearly emissions for the various production
schemes considered in this study. As explained above, these
schemes were calibrated to the yearly emissions target (cap)
of 300Mt CO2, so that only 5% of the scenarios would give a
yearly emissions level above target. Obviously, this does not
apply to BAU scenarios. They ignore the cap and miss the
target because of the lack of penalty. For standard and rel-
ative cap-and-trade schemes, producers’ emissions are tightly
concentrated just below the cap, showing that in both cases
producers emit as much as possible while remaining under
the cap. Because of the randomness inherent in the relative
scheme, producers end up emitting less.
But the striking fact illustrated by this figure is the width
of the histogram of the yearly emissions under an emission tax.
Guaranteeing that the yearly emissions will not be greater
than the cap more than 5% of the time can only be done
at the cost of widely fluctuating yearly emissions due to the
stochasticity of abatement costs (fuel switching). Since these
fluctuations remain below the cap, they could be viewed as a
sign that properly calibrated, the tax scheme is better than
the cap-and-trade schemes for emissions reduction. However,
clearly the shape of the histogram shows a lack of efficiency
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Fig. 4. Histograms of the yearly distibution of windfall profits for the four schemes
considered in our case study. Note that the only scheme with close to zero windfall
profits is the Relative Scheme.
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Fig. 5. Histogram of the yearly distribution of consumer costs for the Standard
Scheme, a Relative Scheme and a Tax Scheme. Notice that the Standard Scheme
with Auction possesses the same consumer costs as the Standard Scheme without
auction, so the corresponding histogram is not plotted.
in the abatement, and as we are about to see, this abatement
happens at a much higher cost.
Windfall Profits.Windfall profits are defined in the appendix.
Figure shows the statistical distributions of the windfall prof-
its. Neither the tax scheme nor the standard scheme with
full initial auctioning of the allowances are able to reduce the
windfall profits to a satisfactory level. The reason is that due
to increased electricity prices, profits are made in all cases
with electricity produced from nuclear power plants while at
the same time, neither the auctions nor the tax can reduce
the earnings of the nuclear plants. The only scheme with
close to zero windfall profits is the relative scheme. As ex-
plained above, the proportional allocation reduces electricity
prices and therefore combats windfall profits at their origin.
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Fig. 6. Yearly abatement costs for the Standard Scheme, the Relative Scheme and
a Tax Scheme.
Consumer Burden.As explained in the appendix, the con-
sumer burden, whose histograms are displayed in Figure 2
for the different schemes, captures the difference in total con-
sumer’s costs with and without regulation. The high con-
sumer burden for the standard scheme is in line with its high
windfall profits. For the tax scheme the histogram indicates
that in average, electricity prices would increase by approxi-
mately 20$ per MWh! However the regulator could give back
part of this amount to the end consumer, e.g. by reducing
other taxes. Because the average auction revenue corresponds
to 9, 5$/MWh consumer costs exceed by far the revenue from
the auction. This amount can only cover about tow thirds of
the consumer costs. Hence the commonly believed argument
that auction revenues can be used to cover costs of endcon-
sumers is wrong and there is still significant wealth transfer
from consumer to producer. On the other hand in the case of a
relative scheme, the consumer burden is tightly concentrated
around zero. This means that even for a reduction target of
20%, electricity costs are nearly the same as in BAU!
Abatement Costs. Figure 2 illustrates the fact that the reduc-
tion costs of the relative cap-and-trade scheme are insignifi-
cantly higher than the reduction costs of the standard cap-
and-trade scheme. Further both schemes are more economical
and emissions control and reduction are easier than with an
emission tax. We see that the cost of emissions reduction is
nearly twice as high than in the case of the tax than for the
cap-and-trade schemes. Again this illustrates the shortcom-
ings of a tax scheme.
Conclusions
The main goal of climate policies is to incentivize the use of
cleaner technologies. Deciding which public policy tools to
use in order to curb Green House Gas (GHG) emissions is
paramount. In this research article, we approached the prob-
lem from three different points of view: social, consumer’s and
producer’s. Our optimal solutions take into account the ran-
domness of the outcomes of the reduction schemes. Although
market mechanisms alone cannot solve all the pollution prob-
lems, we proved that properly designed cap-and-trade schemes
can work if
• they are given the right emission targets and penalty;
• the appropriate tools are used to allocate emissions credits.
Despite the fact that they are easy to explain and imple-
ment, taxes (see for example [5] for a discussion in the context
of pollution abatment) are the least efficient of the schemes
considered in this study. Because of the uncertainties in the
demand for goods and the costs of productions they are less
efficient and more costly than cap-and-trade schemes. In par-
ticular, we demonstrate in this study that, when it comes
to reaching emissions targets they do not perform as well as
properly designed cap-and-trade schemes. Moreover, taxes
are unpopular and in most countries, synonymous of politi-
cal suicide for policy makers. So it seems that taxation will
very unlikely be considered as an alternative to cap-and-trade
mechanisms.
Auctioning is very popular among the supporters of cap-
and-trade schemes puzzled by the magnitude of the windfall
profits of the first phase of EU ETS. We show that auctions
cannot lower windfall profits to a reasonable level. They
merely help the re-distribution of these costs. Indeed, even
if one uses the figures advanced in the discussions of the most
optimistic scenarios for the planned US regulations, the rev-
enues of the auctions (expected to be in the range of 9, 5 $
5
per MWh) remain orders of magnitude smaller than the con-
sumer costs, covering only approximately two thirds of the
latter. Hence the commonly believed argument that auction
revenues can be used to cover costs of end consumer costs
needs to be substantiated as there is significant wealth trans-
fer from consumer to producer.
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate the
merits of new cap-and-trade schemes and for that, we study
the costs and benefits of what we call a relative allocation
scheme in which allowances are distributed proportionally
to the production of goods at the source of emissions. This
design is reminiscent in spirit of some of the features of the
California Low Emissions Fuel initiative [6]. We show that
such a proportional allocation scheme
• Can reach emissions targets;
• Offers a perfect control of the windfall profits;
• Minimizes the consumer costs.
The theoretical and quantitative analyzes of cap-and-trade
schemes for the purpose of emissions reduction are still in
their infancy. However, we hope that this contribution will
convince regulators and policy makers of the importance of
the insight which could be gained from using the tools devel-
oped for the purpose of this study.
Appendix
If for a given demand Dt on day t, we denote by S
∗
t the equi-
librium price of electricity under a cap-and-trade regulation,
and similarly by SBAU∗t the equilibrium price of electricity in
BAU (i.e. in the absence of a penalty and a market for emis-
sions) then the Consumer Burden due to the regulation is
defined as
CB =
X
t
(S∗t − S
BAU∗
t )Dt.
Note that we would sum this quantity over all the goods if we
included more than electricity in our case study. See for ex-
ample [1]. On the other end, the producers’ burden is defined
as the quantity
RC =
X
t
X
i,j
(ξi,j∗t − ξ
BAU,i,j∗
t )C
i,j
t .
which we callReduction Costs orAbatement Costs. Here
we denote by Ci,jt the cost to producer i of producing on day
t, one MegaWatt hour of electricity with technology j, and
ξi,j∗t is the optimal amount that producer i will output in
equilibrium on day t with technology j. Clearly, ξBAU,i,j∗t is
the analog quantity in the BAU scenario. With these two def-
initions in mind, it is natural to define the Excess Profit as
the difference between he Consumer Burden and the Reduc-
tion Costs to which we add the possible Penalty Payments.
However, this natural notion of Excess Profit is different from
what we define as Windfall Profits. Indeed the later are
defined (see [1]) as another way to understand the extra prof-
its made by the producers. If ξ∗ is an optimal production
strategy in equilibrium, we define the electricity target price
Sˆt as:
Sˆt := max
i,j
Ci,jt 1{ξ∗i,jt >0}
. [2]
This price is the marginal cost under the optimal production
schedule without taking into account the cost of pollution. We
then define the overall windfall profits as
WP =
X
t
(S∗t − Sˆt)Dt −M A0. [3]
These windfall profits measure the profits for the production
of goods in excess over what the profits would have been, had
the same dispatching schedule been used, and the target prices
(e.g. the marginal fuel costs) be charged to the end consumers
without the cost of pollution. The quantity M appearing in
formula (3) is the number of allowances auctioned at time t =.
Note that we have M = 0 when the scheme does not include
an initial auction.
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Table 1. Production ca-
pacity in the two Japanese
electricity markets
Production Capacity in GW
Type East West
Nuclear 27 26
Coal 31 11
LNG 35 33
Oil 27 14
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